I was interested to read Justice Baker’s decision for a unanimous Iowa Supreme Court in Lawson v Kurtzhals, No. 08–1766 (Iowa 12/3/2010). Civil procedure and evidence cases do not usually hold my attention very long, but this one seemed like a victory for the rule-followers against the rule-breakers. I probably spend too much time trying too hard to make sure that I follow the rules of procedure. Frankly, I get concerned about blowing some deadline and then being liable to the client for not having done my job properly. I probably wouldn’t otherwise blog about such a case, but it struck me because it always seems like the other side gets away with the looseness of notice pleading, blown deadlines, and general rule-breaking.
In Lawson, Justice Baker appears to me to have made a stern statement to the scofflaws of the profession. The defendant in that case requested a statement of damages from the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to answer a couple of times, once in interrogatories and once in depositions. The defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent evidence on damages that had not been disclosed. Trial began. The trial court after two (?!) arguments on the motion, finally granted the motion. After three days of trial, the plaintiff responded by a motion to dismiss, which was granted, and re-filing a substantially identical action. In other words, the plaintiff basically attempted and the trial court effectively allowed the plaintiff to hide the evidence, drag the defendant through three days of trial, and then start all over. Justice Baker said “no,” the plaintiff did not get a second bite at the apple.
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal order and sent the case back to be retried with the previous exclusionary order. The rules of procedure and the rules of evidence do, in fact, mean something. Litigants do, in fact, have to disclose their evidence and supplement it in a timely way before trial. The trial court obviously has a tough job balancing fairness, due process, and enforcing the rules. There is sometimes tremendous inertia because of the cost and difficulty of getting and enforcing sanctions in litigation. Here, the Supreme Court seems like they put down a marker that needed to be set.
